[h=1]Vladimir Putin wants to destroy Nato: the Syria war may offer him the chance[/h][h=2]The tragedy now unfolding in Aleppo poses a direct threat to European security, including the risk of conflict between Nato and Russia[/h]
By David Blair
4:17PM GMT 13 Feb 2016
When is a ceasefire not a ceasefire? Perhaps when it allows a blood-soaked tyrant to continue raining barrel bombs on his rebellious people. The “nationwide ceasefire” supposedly agreed for Syria belongs in a special category of futility.
Bashar al-Assad’s Russian friends made very sure that the truce signed in Munich does not stop anyone from attacking “terrorists” – and the dictator flatly maintains that he has never done anything else.
After all, Assad defines every Syrian who has ever opposed him as a “terrorist”. So the logic is inescapable: operations against “terrorists” are allowed, all Assad’s enemies are “terrorists”, therefore the regime’s onslaught can press on as normal.
Assad may now complete the encirclement of Aleppo and ravage the last enclave of northern Syria held by non-Islamist rebels – with Russia bombing from the air and Iran supplying fighters on the ground – and still obey the terms of the truce. As an example of supremely cynical diplomacy, the Munich ceasefire is in a class of its own.
In truth, the latest events in Syria are still more worrying. The tragedy now unfolding in and around Aleppo poses a direct threat to European security, combining the dangers of terrorism with the risk of direct conflict between Nato and Russia.
We tend to associate the latter peril with Nato’s most exposed European members and the possibility of Vladimir Putin invading the Baltic states. But never forget that Turkey is also part of Nato.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already threatened to send Turkey’s army over the border into Syria, with the twin aims of preventing the defeat of his rebel allies and carving out a buffer zone along the frontier. Suppose Mr Erdoğan were to go ahead and deploy his troops in Syria: the greatest risk would be that Russia responds with air strikes against Turkish forces.
How plausible is the following scenario? After Russia bombs Turkish troops inside Syria, Mr Erdoğan deploys his air force to protect his ground units – and three Russian MiGs are shot down. Russia immediately retaliates by striking the air base inside Turkey used by the jets that destroyed the MiGs.
After one of his air force bases is pulverised by the Kremlin’s bombs, Mr Erdoğan then declares that Turkey has suffered aggression from Russia. He demands the help of his allies in accordance with Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an “armed attack against one” Nato member “shall be considered an attack against them all”.
Put bluntly, Mr Erdoğan could invite us to choose between going to war with Russia, or shredding the credibility of the collective security guarantee that serves as the bedrock of Nato. How would we respond?
When it comes to terrorism, the only group that has already attacked Europe – the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) – is also the only armed group in Syria that enjoys a measure of immunity from the striking power of Assad and Russia. The dictator’s strategy remains what it has always been, namely to crush every enemy except Isil and then force the West to make a choice.
But there is one great danger with this amoral plan. Millions of ordinary Syrians would also be compelled to make this terrible decision. Which way would the country’s Sunni majority jump? If they are forced to side with Isil’s Sunni zealots on the one hand, or an Alawite dictator who has butchered their compatriots with the aid of Shia Iran and Christian Russia, how many would line up behind the jihadists?
And what about the rebels caught between Assad’s pincers? From the start of this conflict, young men have fought with one armed group and then the next, moving between militias, Islamist rebels and even Isil. The only general rule is that any groups in trouble tend to lose their recruits.
Rather than risk defeat and, at best, the horrors of the dictator’s jails, many of the fighters who are now with non-Islamist groups may go over to Isil. If so, Isil could emerge as one winner from Assad’s impending victory near Aleppo – which is exactly what he would wish, since building up the jihadists has been his survival strategy all along. But Europe would then have to cope with an even greater danger from terrorism.
Suddenly, the greatest risks to our security are converging on the plains north of Aleppo.
By David Blair
4:17PM GMT 13 Feb 2016
When is a ceasefire not a ceasefire? Perhaps when it allows a blood-soaked tyrant to continue raining barrel bombs on his rebellious people. The “nationwide ceasefire” supposedly agreed for Syria belongs in a special category of futility.
Bashar al-Assad’s Russian friends made very sure that the truce signed in Munich does not stop anyone from attacking “terrorists” – and the dictator flatly maintains that he has never done anything else.
After all, Assad defines every Syrian who has ever opposed him as a “terrorist”. So the logic is inescapable: operations against “terrorists” are allowed, all Assad’s enemies are “terrorists”, therefore the regime’s onslaught can press on as normal.
Assad may now complete the encirclement of Aleppo and ravage the last enclave of northern Syria held by non-Islamist rebels – with Russia bombing from the air and Iran supplying fighters on the ground – and still obey the terms of the truce. As an example of supremely cynical diplomacy, the Munich ceasefire is in a class of its own.
In truth, the latest events in Syria are still more worrying. The tragedy now unfolding in and around Aleppo poses a direct threat to European security, combining the dangers of terrorism with the risk of direct conflict between Nato and Russia.
We tend to associate the latter peril with Nato’s most exposed European members and the possibility of Vladimir Putin invading the Baltic states. But never forget that Turkey is also part of Nato.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already threatened to send Turkey’s army over the border into Syria, with the twin aims of preventing the defeat of his rebel allies and carving out a buffer zone along the frontier. Suppose Mr Erdoğan were to go ahead and deploy his troops in Syria: the greatest risk would be that Russia responds with air strikes against Turkish forces.
How plausible is the following scenario? After Russia bombs Turkish troops inside Syria, Mr Erdoğan deploys his air force to protect his ground units – and three Russian MiGs are shot down. Russia immediately retaliates by striking the air base inside Turkey used by the jets that destroyed the MiGs.
After one of his air force bases is pulverised by the Kremlin’s bombs, Mr Erdoğan then declares that Turkey has suffered aggression from Russia. He demands the help of his allies in accordance with Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an “armed attack against one” Nato member “shall be considered an attack against them all”.
Put bluntly, Mr Erdoğan could invite us to choose between going to war with Russia, or shredding the credibility of the collective security guarantee that serves as the bedrock of Nato. How would we respond?
When it comes to terrorism, the only group that has already attacked Europe – the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) – is also the only armed group in Syria that enjoys a measure of immunity from the striking power of Assad and Russia. The dictator’s strategy remains what it has always been, namely to crush every enemy except Isil and then force the West to make a choice.
But there is one great danger with this amoral plan. Millions of ordinary Syrians would also be compelled to make this terrible decision. Which way would the country’s Sunni majority jump? If they are forced to side with Isil’s Sunni zealots on the one hand, or an Alawite dictator who has butchered their compatriots with the aid of Shia Iran and Christian Russia, how many would line up behind the jihadists?
And what about the rebels caught between Assad’s pincers? From the start of this conflict, young men have fought with one armed group and then the next, moving between militias, Islamist rebels and even Isil. The only general rule is that any groups in trouble tend to lose their recruits.
Rather than risk defeat and, at best, the horrors of the dictator’s jails, many of the fighters who are now with non-Islamist groups may go over to Isil. If so, Isil could emerge as one winner from Assad’s impending victory near Aleppo – which is exactly what he would wish, since building up the jihadists has been his survival strategy all along. But Europe would then have to cope with an even greater danger from terrorism.
Suddenly, the greatest risks to our security are converging on the plains north of Aleppo.
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