History and Humiliation

[entropy]

By Shibley Telhami - Friday, March 28, 2003; washingtonpost.com

As the battle for Baghdad begins and public opinion in the Middle East is further inflamed, the prevailing view in Washington remains that military victory will fix everything in the end. Two notions drive this view: that the defeat of Saddam Hussein will put the militant forces in the Middle East on the defensive and that the overwhelming exercise of American power will command respect, thus compliance, in the region, even if it doesn't win hearts. Neither is supported by historical trends.

It is reasonable to argue that forces of militancy in the Middle East went on the defensive after the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, those hoping for radical change in the region had pinned their hopes on the power of states such as Iraq. The sense of Arab vulnerability after the demise of the Soviet Union created a vacuum of power that Saddam Hussein sought to fill. But the defeat of Iraq in 1991 dashed the aspirations of those seeking radical change.

Today militancy in the Middle East is fueled not by the military prospects of Iraq or any other state but by a pervasive sense of humiliation and helplessness in the region. This collective feeling is driven by a sense that people remain helpless in affecting the most vital aspects of their lives, and it is exacerbated by pictures of Palestinian humiliation. There is much disgust with states and with international organizations.

Few in the Middle East believe Iraq has a serious chance in its war with the United States, and pictures of overwhelming American power exercised against an inferior Iraqi army have only reinforced the belief that Iraq is a helpless victim. Unfortunately, the inspirations for overcoming weakness are non-state militant groups, which serve as models that many hope to emulate. The defeat and occupation of Iraq are likely to exacerbate the sense of humiliation and to increase militancy in the region.

It is instructive to look back at similar moments in regional history, when states failed to deliver. The collective Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 war left Arabs in despair after they had put their faith in the potential of Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was non-state militant groups that revived hope for change. Within months independent Palestinian groups emerged and began operating within and outside the region. An episode in 1968 was especially telling. As Israeli forces raided a Palestinian stronghold in the town of Karameh in Jordan, they suffered more casualties than expected, and the operation was seen as a failure. News of the Palestinian success was quickly contrasted with the devastating failure of Arab states. Karameh, which coincidently means "dignity" in Arabic, became a metaphor for restoring regional honor. Within days, 5,000 recruits signed up to join the Palestinian groups in refugee camps.

The notion that the overwhelming exercise of power can achieve peace in areas of protracted conflict is not supported by the modern history of the Middle East. To be sure, power can prevent one's defeat and inflict significant pain on the enemy, but rarely can it ensure long-term compliance. In its confrontation with Lebanon, Israel's overwhelming military superiority over the weakest of neighbors has not translated into the power to compel the Lebanese to accept Israel's terms or eliminate militancy. The Palestinians, after 35 years of occupation, are less resigned to their fate than ever. In fact, studies of conflict and cooperation among different parties in the region show that conflict goes on despite the inequality of power as the weaker party's threshold of pain increases with every blow. The asymmetry of power is often balanced by an asymmetry of motivation.

Dignity has sometimes been a factor even in the calculations of states, despite significant imbalances of power. In explaining the reasoning for Egypt and Syria's launching a war against a superior Israel in 1973, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger put it this way: "Our definition of rationality did not take seriously into account the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect." It is unlikely that Egypt's president, Anwar Sadat, would have been able to extend his hand to Israel four years later without having restored his people's dignity.

Besides the defeat of Iraq in 1991, one reason the militants in the region were put on the defensive was the emergence of a plan that raised hopes for a fair, negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. That some such plan will be even more necessary after the war with Iraq is clear. The prospects for it are not. It is improbable that Arab-Israeli peacemaking will become the Bush administration's top priority after the collapse of the regime in Baghdad. Defending thousands of troops in Iraq, maintaining Iraq's unity, addressing the North Korean challenge, focusing on the economy -- all these will surely be higher priorities. It is certainly possible, though not likely, that Arabs and Israelis will decide to move forward on their own for reasons unrelated to the United States. But it is not possible to imagine that the issue will go away, that the region will deem it less important than before, or that the exercise of overwhelming force will command compliance and reduce militancy -- even if the region is stunned into a temporary lull.

To honor the sacrifice of young American (and British) soldiers, and the many innocent victims in Iraq, we must begin at home by challenging faith in the overwhelming use of force as a primary instrument of foreign policy -- even as we hope for a quick and decisive end to the Iraq war.

The writer is Anwar Sadat professor of peace and development at the University of Maryland and senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution.

i have suggested previously i do not see how it is possible to take Baghdad without unacceptably high casualties, either civilian or allied or both. yet another problem is what happens afterwards where there are reasonable chances the Iraqis will resist occupation just as the Palestinians do. potential nightmare.

 

[cussin'it]

Here, Here

See the Hawks just don't understand other people's, cultures, and regional attitudes. They don't care much for diplomatic foreign policy, just exercise of force, domination, and hypocracy. I would like to point out that our government as a whole has failed in its attempt to resolve the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and futher alienated the Arab world. Looking the other way when Israel violates UN resolutions by the dozens, but invade the Arabs when they violate. This includes Democrats and Republicans both equally responsible for this region's instability.

_________________________
Sure could use a trim

 

[silver7]

Just noticed you`re from one of my very favorite places in the world. Have an old svc. buddy in Fayettville. Love the fishing down there. Last 2 posts on the mark. I`m not anti semitic but, do believe there are too many in this admin. w/pro Israili agendas. And for all the reasons stated am fearful of the backlash against us, when the Arab world feels the humiliation of defeat once again.

I love my country but fear my government.

 

[entropy]

Is Saddam the new Stalin? - By Gwynne Dyer - March 28 2003

theage.com.au

Historical analogies are often misleading, but have you noticed that Saddam Hussein, in recent TV broadcasts, looks more and more like Joseph Stalin? That's how he's positioning himself politically, too.

Like Stalin during the Second World War, Saddam is effectively telling Iraqis to forget about the socialist ideology, the purges and all the rest, and unite against the foreign invader. And as in the old Soviet Union, a lot of the citizens seem to be listening.

Stalin's finest hour was in 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union with the confident expectation of destroying it in a matter of weeks. He had this brilliant new military technique, blitzkrieg, which allowed relatively small numbers of German troops to spread "shock and awe" among the defenders (the phrase was first used in the Nazi magazine Signal) and achieve a rapid victory at low cost.

The blitzkrieg technique had beaten France in six weeks in 1940, and Hitler calculated it ought to work even better against the Soviet Union because the vast majority of Soviet citizens hated Stalin and the Communist Party. Stalin's secret police had murdered millions, and all the non-Russian citizens of the multinational Soviet empire hated Russian rule. So masses of Soviet troops would defect at the first opportunity, and the non-Russian half of the population would greet the Germans as liberators. Sound familiar?

In July 1941, the German army launched its armoured columns into the Soviet Union, and within weeks its tanks were many hundreds of kilometres inside the country. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were cut off and left behind as the tank spearheads raced for Moscow; points of resistance were bypassed in the interest of speed; "shock and awe" was the essence of the strategy.

But the cut-off Soviet troops did not surrender, the garrisons of the bypassed towns attacked the German supply lines, and the people did not strew roses at the feet of the invaders. Most Soviet citizens remained loyal to their country despite the monstrous character of its ruler.

The German spearheads ultimately got close to Moscow, but after such delays that winter closed down their offensive, and the Soviet capital was never captured. Instead, the war turned into a nightmare battle of attrition that eventually destroyed the German army.

This history offers some precedents that must be keeping the commanders of the allied forces in Iraq awake at night. This is not to imply that George Bush is like Adolf Hitler, or that the US Administration's goals in Iraq resemble Nazi Germany's in the Soviet Union. But US military strategy now does resemble German military strategy then, and there are equally close parallels between Stalin's Soviet Union and Saddam's Iraq.

Look at the US strategy in Iraq. It depends on "shock and awe", mostly in the form of air power delivered right on target (Stukas then, cruise missiles now), to bewilder and demoralise the defenders. It bypasses points of resistance, ignores traditional military wisdom about securing lines of supply, and heads straight for the capital. Above all, it depends on the assumption that the enemy ruling party is so rotten that the whole edifice will collapse at the first hard push. But it didn't in the Soviet Union, and it hasn't in Iraq.

So is the US Army in the same predicament before Baghdad that the German army was outside Moscow in 1941? Technically, yes: it's 500 kilometres from its base of supply with unbroken enemy forces all along its lines of communications. But that's as far as the analogy goes, because the US Army is so overwhelmingly strong that it can make mistakes and still win.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, it was attacking a country with a bigger industrial base and twice as many people: there was no margin for error if the German blitzkrieg tactics didn't produce a quick win. By contrast, Americans outnumber Iraqis 12-to-one, and the US defence budget is 250 times bigger than Iraq's.

Defeating the Iraqis will take longer and cost more than Donald Rumsfeld expected - but defeated they will be. MAYBE

Gwynne Dyer is a London-based journalist, author and film-maker.

 

[cussin'it]

Hey Silver, I'm about 20 clicks north of Fayettenam, went to school there. Fishing is indeed great, gonna start heatin up in next couple weeks!
You and I agree on this issue, while I am non-partisan, I give credit to Clinton for his ability to see both sides of policy and give the opposition respect for their views. I don't get that sense from Republican leadership ever. This administration has only one way, and its their way, screw the rest of the world. Pretty sad with all the bright minds in this country that we've resorted to this.

_________________________
Sure could use a trim

 

[entropy]

even former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara admitted that he and other US war planners had never understood Vietnamese history and culture.

Whoever wins the war, the US has lost the peace
By Adrian Hamilton
28 March 2003

The propaganda war has now spread from the war to the diplomacy of post-war. To listen to British briefers you would think that Tony Blair had been leading a fully mechanised brigade over to the US to force Washington to admit the United Nations to the task of reconstructing Iraq, and to reverse its pro-Israeli stance.

It's largely flim-flam, of course. Just as the Pentagon had prepared its war plans for nearly a year before this invasion, so it has prepared its peace plans for almost as long. In the same way that George Bush was prepared to go to the UN in the run-up to war so long as it backed his plans, so he is prepared to see the UN participate in relief and fundraising for reconstruction so long as it in no way dilutes US control. "He who holds the stick, owns the buffalo," as the old Indian saying has it.

If Bush has been prepared to be rather more positive (although still not committed to a date) about publishing the "road-map" to Middle East peace, it is not so much because of Blair but more in answer to the demands of the Arab states providing facilities in this war that the US do something to appear more even-handed (if only to help them to pacify their populations). Whether Bush is actually prepared to face down Ariel Sharon depends partly on the course of war. If it ends in dramatic victory, the administration may be emboldened to push for real progress; if it doesn't go so well, Bush won't risk antagonising the domestic Jewish vote.

Yet in a real sense it no longer matters just what Washington thinks or plans for post-war Iraq. Just as it struggles to win the war, and still seems certain to do so, so it is losing the peace, and is probably too late to save it. America, and with it Britain, may try to project the war as one of "liberation" for the Iraqis, but the rest of the world has largely made up its mind to the contrary. This, in their eyes, is an American invasion fought for American reasons.

In the Allies' Central Command HQ in Doha, they produce images to show the precision of Western bombing and the rapidity of the US push on Iraq. Walk down the road and the studios of al-Jazeera are pumping out images of a Third World country trying vainly to fight back against a hyperpower of infinite technological superiority.

There is no doubt which version most of the world believes. Even in India, where anti-Muslim feelings lie close to the surface, you don't meet a single person who thinks this is anything other than an American enterprise fought for selfish reasons.

"Why," they ask you in genuinely concerned terms, "is Blair going along with it?"
It's difficult to know what would shift this view. An early victory would only confirm the image of humiliating Western technological superiority. Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons might raise a counter-reaction, although even here many in the Third World would regard this as understandable given the technical disparity. But an outpouring of Iraqi delight at being freed from Saddam won't change opinion, as it would be taken as a byproduct of American actions, not its main intention.

Donald Rumsfeld's suggestion that victory will bring a thousand friends misses the point. Of course small countries, and even quite large ones, must accommodate America's position as the world's only superpower. But to boast, as President Bush did in yesterday's press conference, that this "is a larger coalition than in the last Gulf war" is self-deluding nonsense.

The 1991 war was fought with the active participation of half-a-dozen Arab armies (including Syria) and the support of almost every country in the UN aside from Russia and China (who both accepted it at the end). This war is being fought by the Americans and British, with a few thousand Australians and a couple of special forces companies from Poland – an entirely Western enterprise.

Other countries have acceded to American requests for facilities, but if they have wanted to keep their help discreet, it is for good reason. Public opinion is clear and unambiguous and the war is only making the streets angrier at their governments' sell-out. It is not for nothing that the ruler of Qatar acts as host to the Allied headquarters and al-Jazeera at the same time, or that Turkey finally failed to give the US more than rights of overflight. Democracy in the Middle East should not be understood to presuppose pro-Americanism. Just the opposite.

If that is what Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney believe then they are fooling themselves, never mind anyone else. When this war is over, Washington will be faced by a single demand throughout the Middle East, including many in Iraq itself, at least among the Shia. And that is to get out of the region as quickly as possible. And they mean weeks, not months never mind the years that the Pentagon is talking about. Whatever it may seem to Iraqis, a continuing military presence by the Americans will be seen by its neighbours as a US occupation, with all the instability and invitation to terrorism that it this will invite. Yet a prolonged occupation is seen as necessary by Washington as the only means of ensuring order in Iraq and keeping it as a unitary state.

That is America's dilemma. Tony Blair's is that he knows it and there is nothing he can do except make the right noises of passionate concern.
a.hamilton@independent.co.uk

 

[silver7]

I usually get down ea. yr about this time. My friend`s bro lives in Hot Springs, saw my first race ever @ Oaklawn, been addicted since. Can`t fight those chiggers you guys have down there tho! Take care.

I love my country but fear my government.

 

[Gargoyle]

Entropy,

Hitler and Stalin was a marriage doomed to divorce by two megalomaniacs from the beginning. They distrusted each other yet had a common bond for domination of regional provinces. Hitler invaded Russia as a preemptive strike against Russia, who in historical opinions, would have struck Germany first, as Germany's army was mostly positioned in Western Europe. The betrayal or double cross is what Stalin used to stir the military and citizens into defeating Germany. This can hardly be equated to what's going on against Iraq. I also question the term liberated. Germany was not there to liberate, but to conquer before being conquered.

Iraq is not a populace country. There cities, if you can call them that, are separated by hundreds of miles of desert. Each of these cities can be contained. This is totally a different type of war then Germany who had to travel against rolling terrain and were subject to the type of guerrilla warfare that Russia subjected the German supply lines to.

Saddam can be compared to both hitler or stalin. But what if Hitler's team of scientist, in the race to create an atomic bomb, succeeded. Hitler, most definately would have used that against Russia and England. Hitler may even have given Japan the technology to defeat the US in the pacific. Saddam most definately, in my opinion, use a nuclear weapon against his neighbors or supply terrorist with the instrument.

The old debate about, what if we took out Hitler before he became too powerful, in anecdotal here. We must and will remove Saddam. He doesn't need a nuclear reactor to get a nuclear bomb. With aid from France, Germany, Russia, and North Korea, he can 'buy' the weapon. That is the threat that we and that region are facing. We cannot allow someone as sadistic as saddam to use such a weapon against us, israel, or any other of the arab nations.

 

[radiofreecostarica]

One of the flaws of the "pre-emptive strike" mentality is expressed here:

Saddam most definately, in my opinion, use a nuclear weapon against his neighbors or supply terrorist with the instrument.

You don't send men to die based on mere opinion.