Chilcot's damning verdict on Blair's Iraq War: 'WMD threat was NOT justified' and 'military action was NOT a last resort

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[h=1]BREAKING NEWS: Chilcot's damning verdict on Blair's Iraq War: 'WMD threat was NOT justified' and 'military action was NOT a last resort'[/h]


  • Chilcot report into 2003 Iraq War is finally published today and Tony Blair is criticised for taking UK into conflict
  • Sir John said that Mr Blair and his Government chose 'military action at that time was not a last resort'
  • Families of soldiers accused ex-PM of starting war 'based on lies' and lawyers will likely try to take Blair to court
  • John Miller, whose son Simon was murdered in Iraq in 2003, said of Mr Blair: 'I want to see him in the dock'
  • Mother of Gary Nicholson, 42, who died in 2005, said: 'I'm not going because it will be a whitewash. Blair has blood on his hands'
  • Ex-PM will be very unlikely to face war crime trial in The Hague - but British soldiers could be prosecuted


By MARTIN ROBINSON, UK CHIEF REPORTER and RICHARD SPILLETT FOR MAILONLINE
PUBLISHED: 07:30, 6 July 2016 | UPDATED: 11:36, 6 July 2016



 

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THE CHILCOT REPORT IN NUMBERS

7 - Years since the Chilcot Inquiry was launched.

2,579 - Days between June 15, 2009, when the inquiry was announced on by then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and July 6, 2016, when the report is expected to be ready for private inspection and security check.

3 - Foreign secretaries to have been in the post since the inquiry was launched - David Miliband under Mr Brown, and William Hague and Philip Hammond under David Cameron.

2.3 million - Words estimated to be included in the report, making it almost four times longer than Leo Tolstoy's epic War and Peace.

10 million - Estimated cost, in pounds, of the inquiry as of January this year.

179 - UK military personnel that died during the Iraq war.




 

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Chilcot report: 2003 Iraq war was 'unnecessary', invasion was not 'last resort' and Saddam Hussein was 'no imminent threat'



  • Sir John Chilcot has delivered his scathing report
  • 'No imminent threat from Saddam Hussein', he says
  • War 'was not the last resort'
  • Certainty over WMD 'was not justified'
  • Tony Blair set UK on path to war at least 8 months before
  • Planning for post-war Iraq was 'wholly inadequate'
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[FONT=&quot]The long-awaited official report into Britain's involvement in the Iraq War has delivered a scathing verdict on Government ministers' justification, planning and conduct of a military intervention which "went badly wrong, with consequences to this day".[/FONT]
 

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[FONT=&quot]F[/FONT][FONT=&quot]ormer prime minister Tony Blair presented the case for war in 2003 with "a certainty which was not justified" based on "flawed" intelligence about the country's supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which was not challenged as it should have been, found report author Sir John Chilcot.


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[FONT=&quot]U[/FONT][FONT=&quot]nveiling his 2.6 million-word report into the UK's most controversial military engagement since the end of the Second World War, Sir John said: "We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.




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In its damning report the inquiry panel found:

  • Judgments about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - WMD - were 'presented with a certainty that was not justified';
  • There was 'little time' to properly prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq, the risks were not 'properly identified or fully exposed' to ministers, resulting in 'equipment shortfalls';
  • Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were under-estimated;
  • Planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam's fall were 'wholly inadequate';
  • Mr Blair's government failed to achieve its stated objectives.



 

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[h=1]'Better to act now and explain later': Blair's private message to Bush on WMD nearly TWO YEARS before Iraq invasion[/h]
  • The Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq report has today published 28 letters which passed between the two leaders
  • A note sent soon after September 11 shows Blair advised Bush to tackle states with weapons of mass destruction
  • In July 2002, around nine months before the war started, Mr Blair told the President 'I will be with you, whatever'



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The messages reveal the Prime Minister told Bush after the September 11 attacks that they should go after states with weapons of mass destruction



 

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Messages which passed between Tony Blair and George W Bush in the build-up to the Iraq war have been published today




 

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Bush and Blair in the White House in July 2003. Blair both supported and exerted influence over the US President in the build-up to war, the emails reveal



 

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Talk of going after countries with WMDs started between the pair the day after terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre




 

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Statement by Sir John Chilcot: 6 July 2016


We were appointed to consider the UK’s policy on Iraq from 2001 to 2009, and toidentify lessons for the future.

Our Report will be published on the Inquiry’s websiteafter I finish speaking.

In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom tookpart in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. That was adecision of the utmost gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictatorwho had attacked Iraq’s neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people,and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council.

But the questions for the Inquiry were:

• whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003;

and• whether the UK could – and should – have been better prepared for whatfollowed.

We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before thepeaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that timewas not a last resort.


We have also concluded that:

• The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weaponsof mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was notjustified.

• Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion wereunderestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after SaddamHussein were wholly inadequate.

• The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.

I want now to set out some of the key points in the Report.First, the formal decision to invade Iraq, if Saddam Hussein did not accept the USultimatum to leave within 48 hours, was taken by Cabinet on 17 March 2003.Parliament voted the following day to support the decision.

The decision was, however, shaped by key choices made by Mr Blair’sGovernment over the previous 18 months – which I will briefly set out.After the attacks on 11 September 2001, Mr Blair urged President Bush not to takehasty action on Iraq.

By early December, US policy had begun to shift and Mr Blair suggested that theUS and the UK should work on what he described as a “clever strategy” for regimechange in Iraq, which would build over time.

When Mr Blair met President Bush at Crawford, Texas, in early April 2002, theformal policy was still to contain Saddam Hussein.

But, by then, there had been aprofound change in the UK’s thinking:

• The Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that Saddam Husseincould not be removed without an invasion.

• The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealtwith. It had to disarm or be disarmed.


• That implied the use of force if Iraq did not comply – and internalcontingency planning for a large contribution to a military invasion hadbegun.

At Crawford, Mr Blair sought a partnership as a way of influencing President Bush.He proposed a UN ultimatum to Iraq to readmit inspectors or face theconsequences.

On 28 July, Mr Blair wrote to President Bush with an assurance that he would bewith him “whatever” – but, if the US wanted a coalition for military action, changeswould be needed in three key areas.

Those were:• progress on the Middle East Peace Process;

• UN authority; and

• a shift in public opinion in the UK, Europe and the Arab world.Mr Blair also pointed out that there would be a “need to commit to Iraq for the longterm”.Subsequently, Mr Blair and Mr Straw urged the US to take the issue of Iraq back tothe UN. On 7 September, President Bush decided to do so.

On 8 November, resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by the SecurityCouncil. It gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face “serious consequences”,and it provided for any further breaches by Iraq to be reported to the SecurityCouncil “for assessment”.

The weapons inspectors returned to Iraq later thatmonth.During December, however, President Bush decided that inspections would notachieve the desired result; the US would take military action in early 2003.By early January, Mr Blair had also concluded that “the likelihood was war”.
 

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Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had extensive ties to terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, according to an official report published by the Pentagon’s Institute for Defense Analyses and released through the Joint Forces Command.
That report, Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, came up with some startling revelations in its 59 pages:

• Saddam’s Iraq trained terrorists for use inside and outside Iraq and in 1999 sent 10 terrorist-training graduates to London to carry out attacks throughout Europe. (Page 1)
• Saddam’s Iraq stockpiled munitions (including explosives, missile launchers and silencer-equipped small arms) at its embassies in the Middle East, Asia and parts of Europe. (Pages 3-4)
• In September of 2001, Saddam’s Iraq sought out and compiled a list of 43 suicide-bomb volunteers in a “Martyrdom Project.” (Pages 7-8)
• The report contains language from a captured Iraqi document which references an attempted assassination of Danielle Mitterand, wife of French President Francois Mitterand, by car bomb. (Page 11)
• The report’s authors describe Saddam’s Iraq as a “long-standing supporter of international terrorism” including several organizations designated as international terrorist organizations by the US State Department. (Page 13)
• Among the organizations that captured Iraqi documents indicate were supported by Saddam’s Iraq were: (Pages 13-15).
> Fatah-Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal Organization). (Author’s note: Abu Nidal was generally considered the world’s most dangerous terrorist in the late 1980s.)
> Palestine Liberation Front (led by Abu al-Abbas). (Author’s note: Abbas was the mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking and the murderer of American Leon Klinghoffer.)
> Renewal and Jihad Organization, which the Iraqi documents describe as a “Secret Islamic Palestinian Organization” that “believes in armed jihad against the Americans and Western interests.”
> Islamic Ulama Group, a radical Islamist group in northern Pakistan.
> The Afghani Islamic Party, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. (Author’s note: Hekmatyar is an Afghan mujahideen warlord who is worked with Osama Bin Laden during the 1990s. US intelligence agencies have lost track of Hekmatyar, but believe that he was trying to join Al Qaeda in 2002 when he released a video message calling for armed jihad against the United States. Reports from BBC-TV and CNN claim that Hekmatyar helped Osama Bin Laden escape from Tora Bora in 2002.
> Islamic Jihad Organization (Egyptian Islamic Jihad). This is perhaps the most startling revelation in the report. Egyptian Islamic Jihad was founded and led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, now Al Qaeda’s co-leader. The group is most infamous for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Zawahiri is known to have worked in the Al Qaeda organization since its inception, while he was still leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in fact. Al Qaeda was started around 1989 and Zawahiri is said to have been a senior member from its earliest days. He was present in Afghanistan with Bin Laden at the time and later he was in Sudan with Bin Laden until being expelled in 1996 and eventually returning to Afghanistan. In 1998, Zawahiri formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with Al Qaeda and has served as co-leader of Al Qaeda ever since. Iraq’s relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad was so close that captured documents indicate that Iraq was able to request that the group hold off on operations against the regime in Egypt in 1993.
In other words, Saddam’s Iraq had a longstanding relationship with the co-leader of Al Qaeda.
• Captured documents show that Saddam’s Iraq was training non-Iraqis in Iraqi training camps a decade before Operation Desert Storm, including fighters from the following nations: Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Eritrea, and Morroco. (Pages 15-16)
• A captured memorandum shows that Saddam’s Iraq had an agreement with an Islamist terrorist group to conduct operations against Egypt during the first Gulf War. (Page 16)
• A detailed, captured document from 1993 “illuminated how the outwardly secular Saddam regime found common cause with terrorist groups who drew their inspiration from radical Islam.” (Page 17)
• In January 1993, as the American military’s humanitarian mission was begun in Somalia, Saddam directed that Iraq “form a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil, especially Somalia.” (Page 18) Interestingly, Osama Bin Laden was setting up identical operations at the same time.
• Saddam’s secret intelligence service (IIS) hosted 13 conferences in 2002 for various terrorist groups. (Page 19)
• Captured Iraqi documents say that the IIS issued passports to known members of terrorist groups. (Page 19)
• Saddam’s Iraq had close ties and provided funding to Hamas, the Palestinian jihadist organization. Captured documents indicate that Hamas offered to carry out attacks for Saddam’s Iraq in return for his support. In fact, Hamas representatives informed the Iraqis that the organization had 35 armed cells around the world hidden among refugees, including in France, Sweden and Denmark. (Pages 24-25).
• Saddam’s IIS manufactured bombs in the early 1990s for terrorist Abu Abbas to conduct attacks against American and other interests. Three instances of these bombs failing are evidently the only thing that prevented terrorist attacks against these interests: (Page 30)

“A bomb intended to destroy the American ambassador’s residence in Jakarta, Indonesia failed.”“Bombs designed to destroy the American Airlines office and Japanese embassy in the Philippines exploded prematurely and damaged only the front of the office, while killing one and wounding another of the terrorists transporting the explosives.”
• Saddam’s Iraq carried out terrorist attacks on members of humanitarian organizations operating in the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq, including Doctors Without Borders, Handicap International and UN-affiliated organizations. (Pages 31-33)
• The IIS was willing to reach out to jihadist terrorist groups, including those known to be affiliated with Al Qaeda. This includes the “Army of Muhammad” in Bahrain, which had threatened Kuwaiti authorities and had plans to attack American and Western interests. (Pages 35-36)
• The report concludes with the following question: “Is there anything in the captured archives to indicate that Saddam had the will to use his terrorist capabilities directly against the United States?” The Institute for Defense Analyses then provides the answer:
Yes.
Conclusion
Those who claim that Saddam had no “direct, operational ties” to Al Qaeda are attempting to narrow the definition of “terrorist-sponsoring nation” to an impossible scope. By this definition, a nation, like Saddam’s Iraq, can provide money, arms, safe haven and cooperation to jihadist terrorist groups and not have “direct, operational ties” to terrorists.
This was never the standard by which a nation found itself on the US State Department’s list of terrorist-sponsoring nations and implies that, unless a dictator is found directly ordering a terrorist attack, that dictator cannot be considered as linked to a terrorist group.
The “direct, operational ties” standard was invented after the overthrow of Saddam and is a ridiculous standard that can never be met.
Five years after United States forces overthrew Saddam Hussein, the Pentagon has produced a blockbuster report that has been both misrepresented and ignored. That report shows that Saddam’s Iraq had extensive ties to international terrorist groups, both Islamist and secular, including organizations that were part of Al Qaeda. No ginned up definition invented for domestic political consumption can change the truth.

http://humanevents.com/2008/03/21/the-truth-about-saddam-and-terrorism/
 

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At the end of January, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for military action by midMarch.

To help Mr Blair, President Bush agreed to seek a further UN resolution –the “second” resolution – determining that Iraq had failed to take its final opportunityto comply with its obligations.

By 12 March, it was clear that there was no chance of securing majority support fora second resolution before the US took military action.Without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the inspectors thatIraq was failing to co-operate and they could not carry out their tasks, mostmembers of the Security Council could not be convinced that peaceful options todisarm Iraq had been exhausted and that military action was therefore justified.

Mr Blair and Mr Straw blamed France for the “impasse” in the UN and claimed thatthe UK Government was acting on behalf of the international community “to upholdthe authority of the Security Council”.In the absence of a majority in support of military action, we consider that the UKwas, in fact, undermining the Security Council’s authority.

Second, the Inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal.That could, of course, only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationallyrecognised Court.

We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided thatthere was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory.

In mid-January 2003, Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair that a further Security Councilresolution would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action. He did notadvise No.10 until the end of February that, while a second resolution would bepreferable, a “reasonable case” could be made that resolution 1441 was sufficient.He set out that view in written advice on 7 March.


The military and the civil service both asked for more clarity on whether force wouldbe legal. Lord Goldsmith then advised that the “better view” was that there was, onbalance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further Security Councilresolution.

On 14 March, he asked Mr Blair to confirm that Iraq had committedfurther material breaches as specified in resolution 1441.

Mr Blair did so the nextday.However, the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear.Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been asked toprovide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a majority in the SecurityCouncil, Mr Blair could take that decision.

This is one of a number of occasions identified by the Inquiry when policy shouldhave been considered by a Cabinet Committee and then discussed by Cabinetitself.

Third, I want to address the assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destructionand how they were presented to support the case for action.

There was an ingrained belief in the UK policy and intelligence communities that:

• Iraq had retained some chemical and biological capabilities;

• was determined to preserve and if possible enhance them – and, in thefuture, to acquire a nuclear capability; and

• was able to conceal its activities from the UN inspectors.

In the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past,current and future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threatfrom Iraq’s WMD.

He said that, at some point in the future, that threat wouldbecome a reality.

The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossierpublished the same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified.



The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to Mr Blair that theassessed intelligence had not established “beyond doubt” either that Iraq hadcontinued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to developnuclear weapons continued.

The Committee had also judged that as long as sanctions remained effective, Iraqcould not develop a nuclear weapon, and that it would take several years todevelop and deploy long range missiles.

In the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair stated that he judged thepossibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD was “a real and present dangerto Britain and its national security” – and that the threat from Saddam Hussein’sarsenal could not be contained and posed a clear danger to British citizens.

Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threatfrom Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. He had also been warned that aninvasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into thehands of terrorists.The Government’s strategy reflected its confidence in the Joint IntelligenceCommittee’s Assessments.

Those Assessments provided the benchmark againstwhich Iraq’s conduct and denials, and the reports of the inspectors, were judged.

As late as 17 March, Mr Blair was being advised by the Chairman of the JointIntelligence Committee that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, themeans to deliver them and the capacity to produce them.

He was also told that theevidence pointed to Saddam Hussein’s view that the capability was militarilysignificant and to his determination – left to his own devices – to build it up further.

It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence andassessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.
 

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The findings on Iraq’s WMD capabilities set out in the report of the Iraq SurveyGroup in October 2004 were significant.

But they did not support pre-invasionstatements by the UK Government, which had focused on Iraq’s currentcapabilities, which Mr Blair and Mr Straw had described as “vast stocks” and anurgent and growing threat.

In response to those findings, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that, althoughIraq might not have had “stockpiles of actually deployable weapons”, SaddamHussein “retained the intent and the capability ... and was in breach of UnitedNations resolutions”.That was not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before theconflict.

In our Report, we have identified a number of lessons to inform the way in whichintelligence may be used publicly in the future to support Government policy.

Fourth, I want to address the shortcomings in planning and preparation.

The British military contribution was not settled until mid-January 2003, when MrBlair and Mr Hoon agreed the military’s proposals for an increase in the number ofbrigades to be deployed; and that they would operate in southern, not northern,Iraq.

There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properlyidentified nor fully exposed to Ministers.

The resulting equipment shortfalls areaddressed in the Report.Despite promises that Cabinet would discuss the military contribution, it did notdiscuss the military options or their implications.

In early January 2003, when the Government published its objectives for postconflictIraq, it intended that the interim post-conflict administration should be UNled.

8By March 2003, having failed to persuade the US of the advantages of a UN-ledadministration, the Government had set the less ambitious goal of persuading theUS to accept UN authorisation of a Coalition-led interim administration.

When the invasion began, UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be awell-executed US-led and UN-authorised operation in a relatively benign securityenvironment.

Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasioncould not have been known in advance.We do not agree that hindsight is required.

The risks of internal strife in Iraq, activeIranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, wereeach explicitly identified before the invasion.

Ministers were aware of the inadequacy of US plans, and concerned about theinability to exert significant influence on US planning. Mr Blair eventually succeededonly in the narrow goal of securing President Bush’s agreement that there shouldbe UN authorisation of the post-conflict role.

Furthermore, he did not establish clear Ministerial oversight of UK planning andpreparation.

He did not ensure that there was a flexible, realistic and fully resourcedplan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions, and addressed the knownrisks.

The failures in the planning and preparations continued to have an effect after theinvasion.

That brings me to the Government’s failure to achieve the objectives it had set itselfin Iraq.

The Armed Forces fought a successful military campaign, which took Basra andhelped to achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein and the fall of Baghdad in lessthan a month.


Service personnel, civilians who deployed to Iraq and Iraqis who worked for the UK,showed great courage in the face of considerable risks.

They deserve our gratitudeand respect.

More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict in Iraq.

Many morewere injured. This has meant deep anguish for many families, including those whoare here today.

The invasion and subsequent instability in Iraq had, by July 2009, also resulted inthe deaths of at least one hundred and fifty thousand Iraqis – and probably manymore – most of them civilians.

More than a million people were displaced. Thepeople of Iraq have suffered greatly.

The vision for Iraq and its people – issued by the US, the UK, Spain and Portugal,at the Azores Summit on 16 March 2003 – included a solemn obligation to help theIraqi people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours. It lookedforward to a united Iraq in which its people should enjoy security, freedom,prosperity and equality with a government that would uphold human rights and therule of law as cornerstones of democracy.

We have considered the post-conflict period in Iraq in great detail, including effortsto reconstruct the country and rebuild its security services.In this short statement I can only address a few key points.

After the invasion, the UK and the US became joint Occupying Powers.

For theyear that followed, Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

TheUK was fully implicated in the Authority’s decisions, but struggled to have a decisiveeffect on its policies.

The Government’s preparations failed to take account of the magnitude of the taskof stabilising, administering and reconstructing Iraq, and of the responsibilitieswhich were likely to fall to the UK.
 

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The UK took particular responsibility for four provinces in the South East.

It did sowithout a formal Ministerial decision and without ensuring that it had the necessarymilitary and civilian capabilities to discharge its obligations, including, crucially, toprovide security.

The scale of the UK effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of thechallenge.

Whitehall departments and their Ministers failed to put collective weightbehind the task.

In practice, the UK’s most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was toreduce the level of its deployed forces.

The security situation in both Baghdad and the South East began to deterioratesoon after the invasion.

We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threatfrom Improvised Explosive Devices and that delays in providing adequate mediumweight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated.

It was not clearwhich person or department within the Ministry of Defence was responsible foridentifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq andAfghanistan.

It did not have sufficient resources to do so. Decisions on resourcesfor Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.For example, the deployment to Afghanistan had a material impact on theavailability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment forsurveillance and intelligence collection.

By 2007 militia dominance in Basra, which UK military commanders were unable tochallenge, led to the UK exchanging detainee releases for an end to the targeting ofits forces.

It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with amilitia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the bestoption available.

The UK military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.We have sought to set out the Government’s actions on Iraq fully and impartially.The evidence is there for all to see.

It is an account of an intervention which wentbadly wrong, with consequences to this day.The Inquiry Report is the Committee’s unanimous view.Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point.

But in March 2003:

• There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein

.• The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued forsome time.

• The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspectionsand monitoring.


Military intervention elsewhere may be required in the future.

A vital purpose of theInquiry is to identify what lessons should be learned from experience in Iraq.

There are many lessons set out in the Report.Some are about the management of relations with allies, especially the US.

Mr Blairoverestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq.

The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear theweight of honest disagreement.

It does not require unconditional support where ourinterests or judgements differ.

The lessons also include:

• The importance of collective Ministerial discussion which encourages frankand informed debate and challenge.

• The need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable andrealistic strategy.

• The vital role of Ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action acrossGovernment, supported by senior officials.

• The need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of Governmentare properly equipped for their tasks.

Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated,debated and challenged with the utmost rigour.And, when decisions have been made, they need to be implemented fully.

Sadly, neither was the case in relation to the UK Government’s actions in Iraq.

To conclude, I should like to thank my colleagues, our advisers and the InquirySecretariat for their commitment to this difficult task.

I also want to pay tribute to Sir Martin Gilbert, who died last year.

As one of the preeminenthistorians of the past century, he brought a unique perspective to our workuntil he became ill in April 2012. We have missed him greatly as a colleague andfriend
 

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[h=1]'I express more sorrow, regret and apology than you may ever know or believe:' Grovelling and humbled Blair finally says sorry for Iraq War and its bloody aftermath but STILL insists 'there were no lies'[/h]
  • Blair insists it was still 'better to remove Saddam Hussein' from power
  • Former prime minister says decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was taken 'in good faith and in best interests of UK'
  • Blair savaged by Chilcot in long-awaited publication of Iraq inquiry today
  • Insists report 'should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies or deceit'
By MATT DATHAN, POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT FOR MAILONLINE
PUBLISHED: 12:07, 6 July 2016 | UPDATED: 14:58, 6 July 2016



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Tony Blair (pictured) made a grovelling apology for his decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and its bloody aftermath today after his reputation was savaged by the Chilcot report


 

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It's really a shame the result. The cause was just. This speech was incredible:


Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on Thursday, July 17, 2003. Here is a transcript of his speech.


Mr. Speaker and Mr. Vice President, honorable members of Congress, I'm deeply touched by that warm and generous welcome. That's more than I deserve and more than I'm used to, quite frankly.


And let me begin by thanking you most sincerely for voting to award me the Congressional Gold Medal. But you, like me, know who the real heroes are: those brave service men and women, yours and ours, who fought the war and risk their lives still.
And our tribute to them should be measured in this way, by showing them and their families that they did not strive or die in vain, but that through their sacrifice future generations can live in greater peace, prosperity and hope.


Let me also express my gratitude to President Bush. Through the troubled times since September the 11th changed our world, we have been allies and friends. Thank you, Mr. President, for your leadership.
Mr. Speaker, sir, my thrill on receiving this award was only a little diminished on being told that the first Congressional Gold Medal was awarded to George Washington for what Congress called his "wise and spirited conduct" in getting rid of the British out of Boston.
On our way down here, Senator Frist was kind enough to show me the fireplace where, in 1814, the British had burnt the Congress Library. I know this is, kind of, late, but sorry.


Actually, you know, my middle son was studying 18th century history and the American War of Independence, and he said to me the other day, "You know, Lord North, Dad, he was the British prime minister who lost us America. So just think, however many mistakes you'll make, you'll never make one that bad."


Members of Congress, I feel a most urgent sense of mission about today's world.
September 11 was not an isolated event, but a tragic prologue, Iraq another act, and many further struggles will be set upon this stage before it's over.
There never has been a time when the power of America was so necessary or so misunderstood, or when, except in the most general sense, a study of history provides so little instruction for our present day.
We were all reared on battles between great warriors, between great nations, between powerful forces and ideologies that dominated entire continents. And these were struggles for conquest, for land, or money, and the wars were fought by massed armies. And the leaders were openly acknowledged, the outcomes decisive.


Today, none of us expect our soldiers to fight a war on our own territory. The immediate threat is not conflict between the world's most powerful nations.
And why? Because we all have too much to lose. Because technology, communication, trade and travel are bringing us ever closer together. Because in the last 50 years, countries like yours and mine have tripled their growth and standard of living. Because even those powers like Russia or China or India can see the horizon, the future wealth, clearly and know they are on a steady road toward it. And because all nations that are free value that freedom, will defend it absolutely, but have no wish to trample on the freedom of others.
We are bound together as never before. And this coming together provides us with unprecedented opportunity but also makes us uniquely vulnerable.


And the threat comes because in another part of our globe there is shadow and darkness, where not all the world is free, where many millions suffer under brutal dictatorship, where a third of our planet lives in a poverty beyond anything even the poorest in our societies can imagine, and where a fanatical strain of religious extremism has arisen, that is a mutation of the true and peaceful faith of Islam.
And because in the combination of these afflictions a new and deadly virus has emerged. The virus is terrorism whose intent to inflict destruction is unconstrained by human feeling and whose capacity to inflict it is enlarged by technology.


This is a battle that can't be fought or won only by armies. We are so much more powerful in all conventional ways than the terrorists, yet even in all our might, we are taught humility.
In the end, it is not our power alone that will defeat this evil. Our ultimate weapon is not our guns, but our beliefs.
There is a myth that though we love freedom, others don't; that our attachment to freedom is a product of our culture; that freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law are American values, or Western values; that Afghan women were content under the lash of the Taliban; that Saddam was somehow beloved by his people; that Milosevic was Serbia's savior.


Members of Congress, ours are not Western values, they are the universal values of the human spirit. And anywhere...
Anywhere, anytime ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the choice is the same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law, not the rule of the secret police.


The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It is our last line of defense and our first line of attack. And just as the terrorist seeks to divide humanity in hate, so we have to unify it around an idea. And that idea is liberty.
We must find the strength to fight for this idea and the compassion to make it universal.
Abraham Lincoln said, "Those that deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves."
And it is this sense of justice that makes moral the love of liberty.
In some cases where our security is under direct threat, we will have recourse to arms. In others, it will be by force of reason. But in all cases, to the same end: that the liberty we seek is not for some but for all, for that is the only true path to victory in this struggle.
But first we must explain the danger.


Our new world rests on order. The danger is disorder. And in today's world, it can now spread like contagion.
The terrorists and the states that support them don't have large armies or precision weapons; they don't need them. Their weapon is chaos.
The purpose of terrorism is not the single act of wanton destruction. It is the reaction it seeks to provoke: economic collapse, the backlash, the hatred, the division, the elimination of tolerance, until societies cease to reconcile their differences and become defined by them. Kashmir, the Middle East, Chechnya, Indonesia, Africa--barely a continent or nation is unscathed.


The risk is that terrorism and states developing weapons of mass destruction come together. And when people say, "That risk is fanciful," I say we know the Taliban supported Al Qaida. We know Iraq under Saddam gave haven to and supported terrorists. We know there are states in the Middle East now actively funding and helping people, who regard it as God's will in the act of suicide to take as many innocent lives with them on their way to God's judgment.


Some of these states are desperately trying to acquire nuclear weapons. We know that companies and individuals with expertise sell it to the highest bidder, and we know that at least one state, North Korea, lets its people starve while spending billions of dollars on developing nuclear weapons and exporting the technology abroad.
This isn't fantasy, it is 21st-century reality, and it confronts us now.


Can we be sure that terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will join together? Let us say one thing: If we are wrong, we will have destroyed a threat that at its least is responsible for inhuman carnage and suffering. That is something I am confident history will forgive.
But if our critics are wrong, if we are right, as I believe with every fiber of instinct and conviction I have that we are, and we do not act, then we will have hesitated in the face of this menace when we should have given leadership. That is something history will not forgive.


But precisely because the threat is new, it isn't obvious. It turns upside-down our concepts of how we should act and when, and it crosses the frontiers of many nations. So just as it redefines our notions of security, so it must refine our notions of diplomacy.
There is no more dangerous theory in international politics than that we need to balance the power of America with other competitive powers; different poles around which nations gather.


Such a theory may have made sense in 19th-century Europe. It was perforce the position in the Cold War.

Today, it is an anachronism to be discarded like traditional theories of security. And it is dangerous because it is not rivalry but partnership we need; a common will and a shared purpose in the face of a common threat.
And I believe any alliance must start with America and Europe. If Europe and America are together, the others will work with us. If we split, the rest will play around, play us off and nothing but mischief will be the result of it.
You may think after recent disagreements it can't be done, but the debate in Europe is open. Iraq showed that when, never forget, many European nations supported our action.


And it shows it still when those that didn't agreed Resolution 1483 in the United Nations for Iraq's reconstruction.
Today, German soldiers lead in Afghanistan, French soldiers lead in the Congo where they stand between peace and a return to genocide.
So we should not minimize the differences, but we should not let them confound us either.
You know, people ask me after the past months when, let's say, things were a trifle strained in Europe, "Why do you persist in wanting Britain at the center of Europe?" And I say, "Well, maybe if the U.K. were a group of islands 20 miles off Manhattan, I might feel differently. But actually, we're 20 miles off Calais and joined by a tunnel."


We are part of Europe, and we want to be. But we also want to be part of changing Europe.
Europe has one potential for weakness. For reasons that are obvious, we spent roughly a thousand years killing each other in large numbers.
The political culture of Europe is inevitably rightly based on compromise. Compromise is a fine thing except when based on an illusion. And I don't believe you can compromise with this new form of terrorism.


But Europe has a strength. It is a formidable political achievement. Think of the past and think of the unity today. Think of it preparing to reach out even to Turkey--a nation of vastly different culture, tradition, religion--and welcome it in.
But my real point is this: Now Europe is at the point of transformation. Next year, 10 new countries will join. Romania and Bulgaria will follow.
Why will these new European members transform Europe? Because their scars are recent, their memories strong, their relationship with freedom still one of passion, not comfortable familiarity.


They believe in the trans-Atlantic alliance. They support economic reform. They want a Europe of nations, not a super state. They are our allies and they are yours. So don't give up on Europe. Work with it.
To be a serious partner, Europe must take on and defeat the anti-Americanism that sometimes passes for its political discourse. And what America must do is show that this is a partnership built on persuasion, not command.


Then the other great nations of our world and the small will gather around in one place, not many. And our understanding of this threat will become theirs. And the United Nations can then become what it should be: an instrument of action as well as debate.
The Security Council should be reformed. We need a new international regime on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
And we need to say clearly to United Nations members: "If you engage in the systematic the mission the coalition. But let us start preferring a coalition and acting alone if we have to, not the other way around.
True, winning wars is not easier that way, but winning the peace is.
And we have to win both. And you have an extraordinary record of doing so.


Who helped Japan renew, or Germany reconstruct, or Europe get back on its feet after World War II? America.
So when we invade Afghanistan or Iraq, our responsibility does not end with military victory.
Finishing the fighting is not finishing the job.
So if Afghanistan needs more troops from the international community to police outside Kabul, our duty is to get them.
Let us help them eradicate their dependency on the poppy, the crop whose wicked residue turns up on the streets of Britain as heroin to destroy young British lives, as much as their harvest warps the lives of Afghans.

We promised Iraq democratic government. We will deliver it.


We promised them the chance to use their oil wealth to build prosperity for all their citizens, not a corrupt elite, and we will do so. We will stay with these people so in need of our help until the job is done.
And then reflect on this: How hollow would the charges of American imperialism be when these failed countries are and are seen to be transformed from states of terror to nations of prosperity, from governments of dictatorship to examples of democracy, from sources of instability to beacons of calm.


And how risible would be the claims that these were wars on Muslims if the world could see these Muslim nations still Muslim, but with some hope for the future, not shackled by brutal regimes whose principal victims were the very Muslims they pretended to protect?
It would be the most richly observed advertisement for the values of freedom we can imagine. When we removed the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, this was not imperialism. For these oppressed people, it was their liberation.
And why can the terrorists even mount an argument in the Muslim world that it isn't?


Because there is one cause terrorism rides upon, a cause they have no belief in but can manipulate. I want to be very plain: This terrorism will not be defeated without peace in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine.
Here it is that the poison is incubated. Here it is that the extremist is able to confuse in the mind of a frighteningly large number of people the case for a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel, and to translate this moreover into a battle between East and West, Muslim, Jew and Christian.
May this never compromise the security of the state of Israel.

The state of Israel should be recognized by the entire Arab world, and the vile propaganda used to indoctrinate children, not just against Israel but against Jews, must cease.


You cannot teach people hate and then ask them to practice peace. But neither can you teach people peace except by according them dignity and granting them hope.
Innocent Israelis suffer. So do innocent Palestinians.
The ending of Saddam's regime in Iraq must be the starting point of a new dispensation for the Middle East: Iraq, free and stable; Iran and Syria, who give succor to the rejectionist men of violence, made to realize that the world will no longer countenance it, that the hand of friendship can only be offered them if they resile completely from this malice, but that if they do, that hand will be there for them and their people; the whole of region helped toward democracy. And to symbolize it all, the creation of an independent, viable and democratic Palestinian state side by side with the state of Israel.


What the president is doing in the Middle East is tough but right.
And let me at this point thank the president for his support, and that of President Clinton before him, and the support of members of this Congress, for our attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland.
You know, one thing I've learned about peace processes: They're always frustrating, they're often agonizing, and occasionally they seem hopeless. But for all that, having a peace process is better than not having one.


And why has a resolution of Palestine such a powerful appeal across the world? Because it embodies an even-handed approach to justice, just as when this president recommended and this Congress supported a $15 billion increase in spending on the world's poorest nations to combat HIV/AIDS. It was a statement of concern that echoed rightly around the world.
There can be no freedom for Africa without justice and no justice without declaring war on Africa's poverty, disease and famine with as much vehemence as we removed the tyrant and the terrorists.


In Mexico in September, the world should unite and give us a trade round that opens up our markets. I'm for free trade, and I'll tell you why: because we can't say to the poorest people in the world, "We want you to be free, but just don't try to sell your goods in our market."
And because ever since the world started to open up, it has prospered. And that prosperity has to be environmentally sustainable, too.
You know, I remember at one of our earliest international meetings, a European prime minister telling President Bush that the solution was quite simple: Just double the tax on American gasoline.


Your president gave him a most eloquent look.

It reminded me of the first leader of my party, Keir Hardy, in the early part of the 20th century.
He was a man who used to correspond with the Pankhursts, the great campaigners for women's votes.
And shortly before the election, June 1913, one of the Pankhursts sisters wrote to Hardy saying she had been studying Britain carefully and there was a worrying rise in sexual immorality linked to heavy drinking. So she suggested he fight the election on the platform of votes for women, chastity for men and prohibition for all.
He replied saying, "Thank you for your advice. The electoral benefits of which are not immediately discernible."
We all get that kind of advice, don't we?


But frankly, we need to go beyond even Kyoto, and science and technology is the way.
Climate change, deforestation, the voracious drain on natural resources cannot be ignored. Unchecked, these forces will hinder the economic development of the most vulnerable nations first and ultimately all nations.


So we must show the world that we are willing to step up to these challenges around the world and in our own backyards.
Members of Congress, if this seems a long way from the threat of terror and weapons of mass destruction, it is only to say again that the world security cannot be protected without the world's heart being one. So America must listen as well as lead. But, members of Congress, don't ever apologize for your values.


Tell the world why you're proud of America. Tell them when the Star-Spangled Banner starts, Americans get to their feet, Hispanics, Irish, Italians, Central Europeans, East Europeans, Jews, Muslims, white, Asian, black, those who go back to the early settlers and those whose English is the same as some New York cab driver's I've dealt with ... but whose sons and daughters could run for this Congress.


Tell them why Americans, one and all, stand upright and respectful. Not because some state official told them to, but because whatever race, color, class or creed they are, being American means being free. That's why they're proud.
As Britain knows, all predominant power seems for a time invincible, but, in fact, it is transient.
The question is: What do you leave behind?


And what you can bequeath to this anxious world is the light of liberty.


That is what this struggle against terrorist groups or states is about. We're not fighting for domination. We're not fighting for an American world, though we want a world in which America is at ease. We're not fighting for Christianity, but against religious fanaticism of all kinds.
And this is not a war of civilizations, because each civilization has a unique capacity to enrich the stock of human heritage.
We are fighting for the inalienable right of humankind--black or white, Christian or not, left, right or a million different--to be free, free to raise a family in love and hope, free to earn a living and be rewarded by your efforts, free not to bend your knee to any man in fear, free to be you so long as being you does not impair the freedom of others.
That's what we're fighting for. And it's a battle worth fighting.


And I know it's hard on America, and in some small corner of this vast country, out in Nevada or Idaho or these places I've never been to, but always wanted to go...
I know out there there's a guy getting on with his life, perfectly happily, minding his own business, saying to you, the political leaders of this country, "Why me? And why us? And why America?"


And the only answer is, "Because destiny put you in this place in history, in this moment in time, and the task is yours to do."
And our job, my nation that watched you grow, that you fought alongside and now fights alongside you, that takes enormous pride in our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be there with you.
You are not going to be alone. We will be with you in this fight for liberty.
We will be with you in this fight for liberty. And if our spirit is right and our courage firm, the world will be with us.
Thank you.
 

Life's a bitch, then you die!
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Sir John Chilcot is another example of someone who has too much time on his hands.


Another notable waster of time was Earl Warren and his Commission.
 

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