Michael J Boskin is professor of economics at Stanford University and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution
Tuesday 13 December 2016 11.42 GMT
Donald Trump’s surprise election as the 45th president of the US has spawned a cottage industry of election postmortems and predictions in the US and abroad. Some correlate Trump’s victory with a broader trend toward populism in the west, and, in particular, in Europe, exemplified by the UK’s vote in June to leave the European Union. Others focus on Trump’s appeal as an outsider, capable of disrupting the political system in a way that his opponent, the former secretary of state and consummate insider Hillary Clinton never could. There may be something to these explanations, particularly the latter. But there is more to the story.
In the months preceding the election, the mainstream media, pundits and pollsters kept repeating that Trump had an extremely narrow path to victory. What they failed to recognize was the extent of economic anxiety felt by working-class families in key states, owing to the dislocations caused by technology and globalization.
But, as I highlighted two months before the election, those frustrations were far-reaching, as was the sense of being ignored and left behind – and it was Trump who finally made that group feel seen. That is why I recognized the possibility of a Trump upset, despite Clinton’s significant lead in the polls (five points, just before the election).
And an upset is what happened. Trump narrowly won states that Republicans had not won in decades (Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania), and won big in usually closely contested Ohio.
In fact, Republicans secured a broad victory. The party retained control of the Senate, even though more than twice as many Republican seats were up for re-election than Democratic seats, and it lost just a handful of House seats, far fewer than the 20 predicted. Moreover, the Republicans now control 33 governorships, compared with 16 for the Democrats, and have expanded their already large majorities in state legislatures. Now talk has turned from the impending implosion of the Republican party to the repudiation, disarray and bleak future prospects of the Democrats.
Since the election, Trump has moved quickly to assert himself. Republicans, even those who opposed Trump during the campaign, have coalesced behind him. Meanwhile, the Democrats in government – most notably Barack Obama – have largely echoed Clinton’s gracious concession-speech injunction that Trump should be given an opportunity to lead.
The US election’s unexpected outcome holds four key lessons, applicable to all advanced democracies.
Tuesday 13 December 2016 11.42 GMT
Donald Trump’s surprise election as the 45th president of the US has spawned a cottage industry of election postmortems and predictions in the US and abroad. Some correlate Trump’s victory with a broader trend toward populism in the west, and, in particular, in Europe, exemplified by the UK’s vote in June to leave the European Union. Others focus on Trump’s appeal as an outsider, capable of disrupting the political system in a way that his opponent, the former secretary of state and consummate insider Hillary Clinton never could. There may be something to these explanations, particularly the latter. But there is more to the story.
In the months preceding the election, the mainstream media, pundits and pollsters kept repeating that Trump had an extremely narrow path to victory. What they failed to recognize was the extent of economic anxiety felt by working-class families in key states, owing to the dislocations caused by technology and globalization.
But, as I highlighted two months before the election, those frustrations were far-reaching, as was the sense of being ignored and left behind – and it was Trump who finally made that group feel seen. That is why I recognized the possibility of a Trump upset, despite Clinton’s significant lead in the polls (five points, just before the election).
And an upset is what happened. Trump narrowly won states that Republicans had not won in decades (Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania), and won big in usually closely contested Ohio.
In fact, Republicans secured a broad victory. The party retained control of the Senate, even though more than twice as many Republican seats were up for re-election than Democratic seats, and it lost just a handful of House seats, far fewer than the 20 predicted. Moreover, the Republicans now control 33 governorships, compared with 16 for the Democrats, and have expanded their already large majorities in state legislatures. Now talk has turned from the impending implosion of the Republican party to the repudiation, disarray and bleak future prospects of the Democrats.
Since the election, Trump has moved quickly to assert himself. Republicans, even those who opposed Trump during the campaign, have coalesced behind him. Meanwhile, the Democrats in government – most notably Barack Obama – have largely echoed Clinton’s gracious concession-speech injunction that Trump should be given an opportunity to lead.
The US election’s unexpected outcome holds four key lessons, applicable to all advanced democracies.
